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A Psychological Theory of Reasoning as 
Logical Evidence—a Piagetian Perspective 
Abstract 
Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that 
theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement 
on logical theories, there is also no consensus on what constitutes logical evidence. In this 
paper, I outline Jean Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning and show how he used it to 
diagnose and solve one of the paradoxes of material implication. I assess Piaget’s use of 
psychology as a source of evidence for logical theory in light of reservations raised by 
psychologism, and I highlight some ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism 
about logic by considering his use of psychology as logical evidence in the framework of 
genetic epistemology, Piaget’s research programme. I conclude that Piaget’s psychological 
theory of reasoning not only plausibly serves as a source of evidence for logical theory but 
also makes a strong case for anti-exceptionalism about logic. 
Keywords 
Logic; logical evidence; exceptionalism, anti-exceptionalism; operations of thought; 
psychologism; constructivism; genetic epistemology. 
1 Introduction: Logic and Psychology 
Traditionally, logic enjoyed an exceptional status. On the one hand, it was thought to be 
elementary, i.e., it looks out for the rationality of the sciences, mathematics, jurisprudence, 
etc., but cannot look to these to look out for itself. On the other hand, its truths were thought 
to have special properties—a priori, necessary, formal, general, etc.— and thus constitute an 
exceptional kind of knowledge. Opinion was divided over the source of such truths. Given 
their exceptional properties, knowledge of them was thought to be acquired without the 
senses, and rationalists conjectured a special mental faculty for grasping them. Reluctant to 
acknowledge any source of knowledge other than the senses, empiricists, on the other hand, 
either argued that sense experience was ultimately the source of logical truths or accepted that 
they are a priori but denied the existence of a special mental faculty for grasping them. The 
latter accounted for the a priori nature of logical truths by appealing to analysis of the 
meaning of concepts involved in statements. (Hjortland 2019, sec. 2; Martin and Hjortland 
2021, sec. 1) 
Until the middle of 19th century, syllogistic logic in the Aristotelian tradition was still the 
dominant paradigm. Due to the work of logicians like George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, 
William Hamilton, Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano, however, syllogistic’s grip on the 
mind was already slipping as Frege, Russell, and Whitehead replaced it by a new paradigm 
(henceforth CL for Classical Logic). For some time after, logic was equated with first-order 
logic, and it has remained the paragon to this day (Jaakko and Sandu 2007, sec. 10). 
Nevertheless, logical pluralism is now accepted (e.g., Russell 2019; Restall and Beall 2000; 
Restall and Beall 2001), and, when asked what logic is, modern logicians, in contrast to their 
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pre-20th-centrury colleagues, are faced with an embarrassment of logical riches from which to 
choose (Jaakko and Sandu 2007, 13; Jacquette 2007, 3). 
In Jacquette’s (2007, 3–4) opinion, at least three factors are key to understanding the 
historical development of a plurality of logics: developments in 19th-century mathematics, 
and the development of modal and relevance logics. Mathematics was already the source of 
inspiration for the vanguard of logicians freeing deductive thought from the shackles of 
syllogistic, and Jacquette suggests that developments in mathematics also paved the way for 
the development of modal and relevance logics. In particular, the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometries in the first half of the 19th century and the astonishing contribution they made to 
the advancement of physics precipitated ‘rethinking the concept of a formal system as any 
self-consistent axiom system whose implications can be rigorously investigated’ and 
encouraged logicians to experiment analogously with different systems of logic (Jacquette 
2007, 4). According to Read (1995, 61), ‘[l]ogic was seen as a set of truths, to be derived 
from self-evident axioms by two or three rules of inference’ already in the classical paradigm, 
and he regards this as a consequence of logical truth taking centre stage under the pre-
eminence of the axiomatic method (Read 1995, 62).  
Whilst the axiomatic method provides a plausible explanation for the means, it does not 
wholly explain the motivation for developing new logical theories1. Whilst an element of play 
was surely involved, the development of many nonclassical logics were internally and 
externally motivated. Foundational concerns in mathematics inspired the development of CL, 
and logicians wishing to widen logic’s scope adapted it to accommodate new subject matter 
such as quantum physics, constructivist philosophy of mathematics, theoretical 
considerations of meaning, natural-language use, etc., whereby anomalies, paradoxes 
especially, played a substantial role. (Haack 1978, chap. 9; Martin and Hjortland 2021, sec. 4) 
Hand-in-hand with the burgeoning of logical theories, logicians began to tap new sources of 
evidence for their theories besides those traditionally accepted. Studies of contemporary 
practice show that logicians are more liberal in their interpretation of logical evidence. For 
example, Hjortland and Martin (Hjortland 2017, 644; Hjortland 2019; Martin 2020) list 
theories of truth, mathematical theories and practice, quantum physics, psychology of 
reasoning, epistemic norms of rationality, vagueness, semantic paradoxes and set theory, in 
addition to empirical findings, and natural-language use. Interestingly, Hjortland mentions 
psychology of reasoning in (Hjortland 2017, 644), but it is not listed in (Martin and Hjortland 
2021). Although no claim is made that the lists are exhaustive, the omission of psychology as 
a possible source is no mere oversight. Hjortland (2019, 255) holds that it is better to 
distinguish logic from reasoning; he also advocates a typical division of labour, according to 
which psychology is appropriate for investigating how we reason while the validity of 
inferences is the subject matter of logical theories. Martin (Martin 2020), on the other hand, 
derives what constitutes logical evidence from the practice of logicians. 
 
1 Following Hjortland (2019, sec. 2; see also 2017, secs. 3 & 4), I will use ‘logical theory’ to denote an account 
of logical properties such as validity, consistency, formality, truth preservation, provability, etc.  
However, I will continue to use ‘logic’ in the singular rather than the plural to refer to logical theories in a 




The ambivalence regarding psychology of reasoning as a source of logical evidence and 
advocacy of a strict division of labour are symptomatic of modern attitudes towards logic and 
psychology. Traditionally, appeal to psychology was often made to shed light on 
philosophical inquiry, especially inquiries into the workings of the mind. Since thoughts are 
mental phenomena and truth is a property of certain types of judgements, it seemed quite 
natural for psychologically orientated philosophers and experimental psychologist alike to 
consider logic to be within their purview. However, psychology as an experimental science 
began to emancipate itself from philosophy at the end of the 19th century, and there was a 
psychological resurgence in philosophy (George 1997; Kusch 2006; Kusch 2015a; Kusch 
2015b). As psychology reached its imperialist heights, Frege saw the need to limit 
psychology’s expansionism by disambiguating the expression ‘laws of thought’ (Frege 1998, 
32:XV–XVII; see also Frege 1993, 30–1) and criticising those who conflate its distinct 
meanings. 
‘Psychologism’ denotes the criticism initiated by Frege and championed by Husserl, and, 
historically, it marked a turning point in the relationship between logic and psychology. 
‘Psychologism’ is not a precise notion; however, sociopsychological encroachments onto 
what is deemed logical, mathematical, epistemological or philosophical turf are accused of 
committing it (Kusch 2006; Kusch 2015b). Although psychologism in logic is not clearly 
defined, it represents a broad accusation that logical elements are being fallaciously conflated 
with mental phenomena (Sober 1978, sec. 1; George 1997; Jacquette 1997; Mohanty 1997; 
Jacquette 2003a, secs. 1, 2, 3; Kusch 2006; Pelletier et al. 2008, sec. 1.1; Urbanski 2011, sec. 
2; Kusch 2015b; Kusch 2015a). In the earliest rebuttals of psychologism, anti-psychologists 
contended that logical justifications would no longer be possible if the distinction between 
laws of thought governing thinking and the laws of truth were lost (Hanna 2006, sec. 1.1; 
Haase 2009, sec. 2.2; Kusch 2015a, sec. 4; Lockhart 2016, 313–17).  
It is testimony to the power of Frege’s and Husserl’s arguments that a strict division of labour 
between logicians, on the one hand, and psychologists and sociologists, on the other, 
represented the status quo for almost a century. More recently, however, interest in the 
psychologism/anti-psychologism debate is being rekindled (Jacquette 1997; Jacquette 2001; 
e.g., Jacquette 2003a; Hanna 2006), and naturalist tendencies in philosophy in general and 
cognitive science in particular are beginning to erode the strict division of labour in more 
recent decades (Jacquette 2003a, sec. 3; Kusch 2006, 2612; Kusch 2015b). In retrospect, 
some philosophers consider criticism of psychologism in logic to have been overzealous. In 
many respects, anti-psychologism in logic has become a dogma, and the faintest hint of using 
psychology as a potential source of evidence for logical theories, heretical, provoking 
damning accusations. A more differentiated critique of psychologism is advocated, discerning 
between justified criticism levelled at plump cases of untenable psychologism and unjustified 
criticism that has stifled research. (Jacquette 1997; Jacquette 2001; Jacquette 2003b) 
Learning from actual practice through historical case studies in mathematics and the natural 
sciences has proven its worth in the philosophy of science, and this method is equally well 
justified in logic (Martin 2020). There are nevertheless limits to what can be learnt from 
practice. What is in contrast to what is considered to be acceptable as logical evidence may 
diverge radically, especially when external factors such as psychologism are in play. In this 
paper, I illustrate how psychology can be used as a source of evidence for logical theories by 
setting out how Jean Piaget used his psychological theory of reasoning as a source logical 
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evidence. I also explore some consequences of tapping psychology as a source of logical 
evidence in the way Piaget suggested for the exceptionalism/anti-exceptionalism discourse on 
logic.  
Jean Piaget (1950a, vol. 1, chap. Introduction) founded an interdisciplinary science of the 
growth of knowledge known as genetic epistemology (GE). Though narrower in scope, GE is 
a research program investigating the mind and its processes much like cognitive science, and 
logic is in its purview. Aiming to understand the nature of logic, Piaget investigated the laws 
of thought socio-psychologically. In contrast to some cognitive scientists though, he did not 
wish to erode Frege’s disambiguation of laws of thought. According to Piaget, the 
demarcation is clear in theory; however, it was not always easy to maintain in practice due to 
inadequate methods in both logic and cognitive psychology. Thanks to progress in the 
formalisation and axiomatisation of logic, on the one hand, and the introduction of a 
psychogenetic approach to cognitive psychology, on the other, Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 
vol. 15, sec. 2; see also Piaget 1957; Piaget and Beth 1966, vol. 12, chap. 7; Piaget 1977a; 
Piaget 2001, 30–35) believed, he respected Frege’s disambiguation whilst showing how logic 
has its roots in psychological laws of thought.  
In this paper, I begin with a psychological perspective on laws of thought, in which I expound 
Piaget’s psychological theory of propositional reasoning. The exposition is quite detailed, and 
I apologise to readers, especially those familiar with Piaget’s work, whilst begging their 
indulgence. The reason for the detail is that Piaget’s theory of reasoning is still poorly 
understood (e.g., Bond 1978; Bond 2005; Johnson-Laird 2006, 249; Smith et al. 2009), but it 
is not only important for my argument to show that Piaget used psychology as evidence for a 
logical theory but that his use is plausible. Operations of thought are key to understanding 
Piaget’s theory of reasoning, I therefore characterize them next before briefly outlining their 
development from elementary co-ordinations of actions to the equilibria they form at the 
operatory stages. Whilst having little direct bearing on logic, the diachronic perspective on 
operations of thought sheds light on the provenance of propositional reasoning and will prove 
helpful in assessing the impact of Piaget’s theory on exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism 
about logic. As well as a diachronic aspect, operations of thought also have a synchronic 
aspect. In equilibrium, the operations of thought form a structure, whose operatory 
mechanisms have regulatory effects on reasoning and therefore a have a direct bearing on a 
logic. ‘Psycho-logic’ is the term Piaget adopted to denote his psychological theory of 
reasoning, but he did not intend it to be a logical theory, despite the terminology; I therefore 
briefly characterize Piaget’s understanding of psycho-logic before addressing the relationship 
he envisaged between logical theory and psycho-logic in the subsequent section.  
Piaget did not formulate a logical theory; however, he characterised in general terms the sort 
of properties logical theories address by distinguishing between formal and real truth. I 
therefore briefly outline Piaget’s demarcation of formal and real truth before moving on to 
consider those operations of thought that exhibit logical properties. Operations of thought in a 
state of equilibrium regulate the compositions of propositions in propositional reasoning; 
however, propositions do not necessarily follow from each other in any logical sense in these 
compositions. This section therefore begins by illustrating deductive operations with the help 
of one of the forms of implication Piaget decerned amid the compositions of operations of 
thought. I then proceed to set out how Piaget used such deductive operations to diagnose and 
resolve ex falso quodlibet, before reflecting more generally on his method. In the final section 
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of this paper, I examine some repercussions of considering psychology as logical evidence in 
the way Piaget envisaged for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic before 
concluding.  
2 Piaget’s Theory of Propositional Reasoning 
Piaget describes how adolescents reason hypothetico-deductively when attempting to grasp 
connections between phenomena as follows: 
Let us take as an example the implication pq, and let us imagine an 
experimental situation in which a child between twelve and fifteen tries to 
understand the connections between phenomena which are not familiar to 
him but which he analyses by means of the new propositional operations 
rather than by trial and error. Let us suppose then that he observes a moving 
object that keeps starting and stopping and he notices that the stops seem to 
be accompanied by lighting of an electric bulb. The first hypothesis he will 
make is that the light is the cause (or an indication of the cause) of the stops, 
or pq (light implies stop). There is only one way to confirm the hypothesis, 
and that is to find out whether the bulb ever lights up without the object 
stopping, or pq̅ (pq̅ is the inverse of or negation of pq). But he may also 
wonder whether the light, instead of causing the stop, is caused by it, or qp 
(now the reciprocal and not the inverse of pq). To confirm qp (stop 
implies light), he looks for the opposite case which would disconfirm it; that 
is, does the object ever stop without the light going on? This case, p̅q, is the 
inverse of qp. The object stopping every time the light goes on is quite 
compatible with its sometimes stopping for some other reason. Similarly, pq̅, 
which is the inverse of pq, is also the correlative of qp. If every time there 
is a stop the bulb lights up (qp), there can be lights without stops. Similarly, 
if qp is the reciprocal of pq, then p̅q is also the reciprocal of pq̅. (Inhelder 
and Piaget 1969, 139) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
p∙q - p∙q - - p∙q p∙q - p∙q - p∙q - p∙q - p∙q - 
p∙q̅ - p∙q̅ - p∙q̅ - - p∙q̅ p∙q̅ - - p∙q̅ p∙q̅ - - p∙q̅ 
p̅∙q - p̅∙q - p̅∙q - p̅∙q - - p̅∙q - p̅∙q - p̅∙q p̅∙q - 

























































Table 1 16 Logical Operators of Interpropositional Operations. The true conjunctions comprise the columns of this table, and 
the columns are set out in pairs comprising the full complement of four conjunctions. Connecting the conjunctions in each 
column disjunctively gives rise to the disjunctive normal form of the logical operators in the bottom row. Except for *, w, 
p[q], and q[p] the binary operators are familiar. * represents the complete affirmation; w, exclusive disjunction, and p[q] as 
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well as q[p] are affirmations of p and q conjointly with either q or p respectively.2 (Based on Table 100 Piaget and Grize 
1972, 214) 
More generally, given any two observable phenomena represented by propositions p and q, it 
is not immediately obvious how they are in fact related to each other. Nevertheless, four 
combinations of these phenomena, represented by the conjunctions p∙q, p̅∙q, p∙q̅ and p̅∙q̅, are 
potentially observable. Individually, each observation does not allow the relationship between 
the phenomena to be determined; observation of p and q always occurring together (p∙q), for 
example, means that p and q could be related in any of 8 ways (p∙q occurs in 8 columns of 
Table 1). Through observation of all four possible coincidences of the phenomena, however, 
the relationship can be uniquely determined. Observation of p∙q and p̅∙q̅ occurring without 
exception but no cases of either p̅∙q or p∙q̅, for example, shows that the phenomena 
represented by p and q are equivalent; whereas observation of p∙q, p̅∙q, and p∙q̅ but no cases 
of p̅∙q̅ means that p∨q (see Table 1). Conversely, if p⊃q is postulated, p∙q, p̅∙q, and p̅∙q̅ are 
observations that are commensurate with the hypothesis, but p∙q̅ would falsify it. In short, a 
framework of theoretically possible relations between phenomena based on combinations of 
observations thus mediates the discovery of the factual relationship between phenomena. 
(Smith 1987, sec. Piaget’s Logic: A Constructivist Interpretation)  
In part, GE explains the ability to reason hypothetico-deductively by describing how it 
develops from more elementary forms of reasoning, and operations of thought are key to the 
diachronic explanation. 
2.1 Operations of thought 
Piaget understands propositions as meaningful categorical statements that are true or false, 
and writes p, q, r, … and p̅, q̅, r̅, … for the affirmations and their negations. With respect to 
propositions, he defines two types of operation. One type consists in combining propositions 
with others to form new propositions with well-defined truth conditions; for example, the 
conditional p⊃q (if p then q) will be a new false proposition in the one case when p is true 
and q false; the conjunction p∙q (p and q) will be a new true proposition only if p and q are 
both true, etc. Since these operations combine propositions as wholes using propositional 
connectives, he denotes them ‘interpropositional operations’ (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:34). 
Another type of operation decomposes propositions into their constituent parts and 
transforms them into new propositions by modifying these parts; for example, in a 
proposition such as ‘this rose is red’, the subject ‘this rose’ can by replaced by other terms 
(‘flag’, ‘all the roses’, etc.), the predicate ‘red’ by others (‘yellow’, ‘black’, etc.), or the 
connection between subject and predicate ‘is’ can be modified (‘this rose excels this one in 
beauty’, etc.). Since these operations are performed on the innards of propositions, Piaget 
denotes them ‘intrapropositional operations’ (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:35).  
 
2 Piaget pursued constructivist ends when modelling propositional reasoning and found it convenient to use the 
symbolism of propositional logic; however, he stresses that the symbols do not have the familiar logical 
meanings (Piaget and Beth 1966, 12:180–1; Apostel 1982). The formalism was only partially revised in the 
second edition to bring it more in line with logical conventions (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:XVI; cf. Seltman and 
Seltman 1985). To facilitate referencing, I adopt Piaget’s notation for the logical operators although it is 
partially antiquated and idiosyncratic. 
7 
 
Piaget’s terminology is adopted in this paper; however, merely denoting their effects on 
propositions and their parts does not make any commitment to the psychological nature of 
operations. Psychologically, Piaget characterises operations as follows:  
operations are actions which are internalizable, reversible, and coordinated 
into systems characterized by laws which apply to the system as a whole. 
They are actions, since they are carried out on objects before being 
performed on symbols. They are internalizable, since they can also be carried 
out in thought without losing their original character of actions. They are 
reversible as against simple actions which are irreversible. In this way, the 
operation of combining can be inverted immediately into the operation of 
dissociating, whereas the act of writing from left to right cannot be inverted 
to one of writing from right to left without a new habit being acquired 
differing from the first. Finally, since operations do not exist in isolation they 
are connected in the form of structured wholes (Piaget 1957, 8; Piaget and 
Beth 1966, 12:172; Piaget 1971a, 21–2; see also Piaget and Grize 1972, 
15:55; Piaget 2001, chap. 2) 
2.2 Psychogenesis of Operations of Thought 
Operations of thought can be better grasped through their development. According to Piaget 
(e.g., Piaget 1952; Piaget 1971b; Piaget 1977b; Piaget 1977c; Piaget 2001), intelligence has 
its roots in the biological organism and develops in a sequence of stages over time. Although 
the number of stages in Piaget’s works varies, the sensorimotor, semiotic, concrete- and 
formal-operational stages are widely accepted (Kesselring 2009). These stages can be more 
broadly categorised into the pre-operational—the sensorimotor, semiotic—and operational—
concrete- and formal-operational—stages. Intra- and interpropositional operations occur in 
the operational stages. 
Living organisms are open, self-regulating systems, according to Piaget. As such, they 
dependent existentially on their environments, and through self-regulation they strive to 
maintain equilibrium between biological integrity and environmental demands. Cognition is 
the natural continuation of biological adaptation, and cognition, just like the biological 
organism, strives to remain in equilibrium with its environment.  
Cognitive equilibria are achieved at the operational stages, but they are presaged by the co-
ordinations of voluntary actions involving sensory stimuli and motor responses during the 
sensorimotor stage. The advent of language at the semiotic stage then heralds a change. The 
enactive world constructed at the sensorimotor stage gradually becomes immersed in a world 
of representations, and the effects of this immersion are twofold: on the one hand, the 
representational world not only encompasses the enactive reality constructed at the 
sensorimotor stage but transcends it in all directions; on the other hand, the manipulations of 
objects can now be performed solely in the mind without the aid of physical manipulation. 
The latter development is interiorization, and a whole new level of interiorization is achieved 
with the advent of operations.  
Operations are interiorised actions, and just as actions occur in coordination with other 
actions, operations occur in concert with others; equilibrium is achieved, however, when 
operations are coordinated with others to form closed systems of transformations that are 
completely reversible. With the emergence of the equilibria, description of the provenance of 
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operations and therefore the diachronic aspect of a psychological explanation of reasoning is 
complemented by a synchronic aspect. In equilibrium, the operations form structured wholes 
amenable to formalisation using the algebraic tools of logic.  
Before moving on to the details of the structured wholes formed by operations in equilibrium, 
a few words need to be said on the genetic-epistemological approach to explanation. 
According to Piaget, two different perspectives must be borne in mind in any psychological 
explanation. In common with any other science, psychological explanation has a third-person 
perspective, namely the psychologists’ as observers, and it is adopted in the diachronic and 
synchronic descriptions of operations. In contrast to natural sciences, however, there is also a 
first-person perspective, namely, the subjective experience of individuals who are in the 
process of cognitive development. The subjective experience is what an individual takes to be 
true at any stage of cognitive development regardless of whether it is actually true. The 
subjective experience changes over time, and psychologists aim to explain these changes by 
‘proceeding from the outside to the inside and not the other way around, namely, seeing in 
conscious implications the product of becoming aware of the organization of actions’ (Piaget 
and Grize 1972, 15:14 my translation). 
Clearly, as subjective experience converges with accepted norms of truth in the course of 
cognitive development, logical truths and their purportedly special properties would be within 
the purview of psychological explanation.  
2.3 The Interpropositional Grouping of Operations 
Reasoning used as a cognitive tool helps determine the relationship between phenomena by 
hypothetico-deductive means. Hypotheses are formed on the basis of evidence, and as new 
evidence becomes available, they are confirmed or falsified; in the latter case, new 
hypotheses are formed to replace the old. In other words, reasoning is a dynamic process; 
Table 1, on the other hand, does not capture this dynamism; it simply presents 
correspondences of relationships between phenomena and observations. Operations of 
thought introduce the dynamism into the static correspondences, and, in equilibrium, they 
form closed systems of transformations.  
Given two propositions p and q representing two phenomena, the four conjunctions p∙q, p∙q̅, 
p̅∙q, and p̅∙q̅ represent possible observable combinations of phenomena, and the 16 distinct 
relations between the phenomena are set out in Table 1. On the one hand, the columns of 
Table 1 are organised into complementary pairs with respect to the full complement of 
conjunctions, and the outcome of composing them disjunctively or conjunctively is the 
complete affirmation or complete negation, respectively. In the words, the complementary 
pairs are exhaustive and complementary, and such compositions correspond to laws of 
thought, namely excluded middle and non-contradiction. On the other hand, the logical 
operators can be transformed into each other; beginning with the equivalence 
p∙q∨p∙q̅∨p̅∙q∨p̅∙q̅=T, the outcome of conjunctively composing the negation of the last 
conjunction with both sides of the equivalence, for example, is [p ∙ q ∨ p ∙ q̅ ∨ p̅ ∙ q ∨ p ∙ q̅] ∙
(p ∙ q)  =  T ∙ (p ∙ q), i.e., p ∙ q ∨ p ∙ q̅ ∨ p̅ ∙ q = (p̅ ∙ q̅) or p∨q since (p∨q)=(p̅ ∙ q̅) . 
Algebraically, the transformation amounts to negating conjunctions of the complete 
affirmation and moving them to the opposite side of the equivalence, where they are 
composed conjunctively with the complete affirmation; in actual reasoning, however, it 
corresponds to excluding the possibility of observing the particular combination of 
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phenomena represented by p̅∙q̅. Moreover, (p│q) ∙ (p̅ ∙ q̅) = (pwq), for example, and 
(pwq)∨(p̅∙q̅)=(p│q). Incompatibility is then a reciprocal exclusion composed disjunctively 
with a joint negation. Conversely, the common part of an incompatibility (p|q) and a 
disjunction (p̅ ∙ q̅)=(p∨q) is [(p∙q̅)∨(p̅∙q)], which is a reciprocal exclusion (pwq). In other 
words, the logical operators can be transformed into each other. In fact, the logical operators 
are the operands of a system of transformations3, and the laws governing the transformations 
are those of a grouping: 
1. The direct operation is the disjunctive union ∨ of conjunctions; 
 e.g., (o)∨(p∙q); (p∙q)∨(p∙q̅); etc. 
2. The inverse operation is the negation of a conjunction united conjunctively; 
 e.g., ∙ (p ∙ q); ∙ (p ∙ q̅); etc. 
3. The general identity operation ∨o leaves the elements it is composed with unaltered, 
e.g., (p∙q)∨(o)=(p∙q); and it is the product of the direct and inverse operations, e.g., 
(p ∙ q) ∙ (p ∙ q) = o.  
4. The special identities are: 
a) Tautology: (p∙q)∨(p∙q)=(p∙q) 
b) Reabsorption: (p∙q)∨[(p∙q)∨(p∙q̅)]=[(p∙q)∨(p∙q̅)] 
c) Absorption: (p∙q)∙(p*q)=(p∙q) 
5. Associativity is limited due to the intervention of special identities; e.g., 
p∙q∨(p̅∙q̅∨p̅∙q)=p⊃q=(p∙q∨p̅∙q̅)∨p̅∙q; however, p∙q∨((p∙q)∙(p ∙ q))≠(p∙q∨p∙q)∙ (p ∙ q) 
because p∙q∨((p∙q)∙(p ∙ q))=p∙q∨o=p∙q but (p∙q∨p∙q)∙(p ∙ q)=p∙q∙(p ∙ q)=o. 
In summary, the operations of the grouping engender the 16 distinct logical operators and 
form a closed system of transformations on them. This grouping is thus a structured whole 
operations of thought achieve in a state of equilibrium, and it serves as a cognitive tool for 
rationally determining relations between phenomena.  
2.4 Psycho-Logic 
Piaget adopted the terminology ‘psycho-logic’ or ‘logico-psychology’ for the formalisation of 
the essential operatory mechanisms of reasoning. Despite the terminology, however, psycho-
logic is not a logic. It is not concerned with the validity of inferences, and it does not provide 
techniques for assessing them; it does, however, utilise logic. Piaget understands psycho-
logic in analogy to mathematical physics. Physics investigates the physical world 
experimentally, and correspondence with empirical evidence is its truth criterium; 
mathematics, on the other hand, is neither based on experiment nor does its truth depend on 
correspondence with empirical evidence. It is a formal science whose truth depends solely on 
the consistency of the deductive systems constructed. With the aim of explaining the physical 
world, mathematical physics draws on both deductive and empirical sources and applies 
mathematics to physics to construct a formal theory based on the experimental findings of 
physics. Like mathematical physics, Piaget (1957, 25; see also Bond 1978; Bond 2005) also 
envisages psycho-logic or logico-psychology as a tertium quid. On the one hand, psychology 
investigates mental life empirically, and its criterion for truth is correspondence with 
psychological facts; on the other hand, logic is concerned with validity and has developed 
 
3 Since the logical operators are simply alternative expressions for disjunctions of conjunctions, the 16 logical 
operators are the operands of the grouping (cf. Seltman and Seltman 1985). 
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algebraic tools. Psycho-logic is an application of these tools to the findings of experimental 
psychology; specifically, it models operations of thought using the algebraic tools logic puts 
at its disposal. 
3 Logic as a Mirror of Thought 
While criticising Denkpsychologie, Piaget (2001, 27) concluded that logic is the mirror of 
thought rather than thought being the mirror of logic as the Denkpsychologen claimed. 
Having thought mirror the laws of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle would 
invest logical laws with causal agency, thus committing reverse psychologism; having logic 
mirror thought, on the other hand, does not. A mirror reflects the parabolic trajectory of a 
projectile under the influence of Earth’s gravity, for example; however, it the projectile itself 
not its reflection looming large in the mirror on impact that shatters the mirror.   
Only the visual aspects of a projectile’s motion are reflected in a mirror. By invoking the 
mirror metaphor for logic, Piaget therefore provoked questions concerning the corresponding 
phenomenon. According to Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:4–7), logic like epistemology 
occupies itself with statements that are capable of being true or false; however, he delineated 
them by contrasting formal and real truth. Real truth refers to the correspondences between 
propositions and facts discovered in the empirical sciences, and it is the concern of 
epistemology; formal truth, on the other hand, refers to the agreement and disagreement of 
propositions that are simply taken to be true or false rather than the correspondence of 
propositions and fact. Since the interpropositional grouping models states of equilibrium 
achieved by operations of thought, psycho-logic is concerned with real truth. Formal truth on 
the other hand is concerned with coherence, contradiction, the internal validity of systems of 
propositions, i.e., how they imply, are necessary consequences, entail, or exclude each other, 
etc. In terms of Piaget’s distinction between real and formal truth, the latter corresponds to 
the visual aspect of the projectile’s motion reflected in the mirror, and the examples listed are 
typical of the logical properties logical theories address (e.g., Priest 2016, 39; Hjortland 2017, 
641; Hjortland 2019, sec. 2). However, Piaget never, to my knowledge, formulated a logical 
theory; nevertheless, with formal truth, he has delineated the sort of properties of propositions 
he would target, and they correspond to the logical properties logical theories typically 
address.  
While well-chosen metaphors can be helpful heuristics in the search for explanations, they 
are not substitutes for positive explanations, and, as helpful as the mirror metaphor is, it 
obscures as well as clarifies the relationship between thought and logic. Being primarily an 
epistemologist not a logician, formal truth did not mark the boundary of Piaget’s interests; he 
also wanted to know ‘what it [formal truth] is the form of’ (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:7). In 
other words, just as reflections in a mirror are images of something real, formal truth is 
according to Piaget the form of a positive reality. Hence, Piaget was not ultimately content 
with a metaphor, and, after several approximative iterations, he finally concluded that logic is 
‘the formal theory of deductive operations’ (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:20 authors’ italics).  
Piaget’s formulation raises a host of questions; however, I will restrict myself to the 
following two groups of questions and address them separately in the two subsequent 
sections: First, how do deductive operations differ from operations of thought? and, what 
logical properties do they present for Piaget’s formal theory to target? Second, how does 
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psychology inform a logical theory, according to Piaget? And how does Piaget envisage a 
formal theory mirroring deductive operations? 
3.1 Deductive Operations 
According to Piaget, the affirmation and negation of a single proposition p already forms an 
interpropositional grouping, and, in his rational reconstruction of the genesis of the 
interpropositional grouping involving multiple propositions, the conditional operator plays a 
pivotal role (Piaget and Grize 1972, vol. 15, sec. 39). Composing p and p̅ disjunctively gives 
rise to the complete affirmation p∨p̅=T; conjunctively, complete negation p∙p̅=o. Along with 
p and p̅, o and T are therefore also operands of this elementary grouping, and the conditional 
unlike many other logical operators is already defined p⊃T=p∙T∨p̅∙T∨p̅∙T̅. Since T̅=o, the 
conditional operator reduces to the affirmation T[p]=p∙T∨p̅∙T; p therefore has common and 
non-common parts with T, namely p∙T and p̅∙T, and the direct operation of the grouping 
unites them into a whole p∙T∨p̅∙T=T. 
The part-whole relationship between propositions is characteristic of implication, and Piaget 
propagated it by introducing a proposition q between p and T such that q=pq∨p̅q, where q 
now plays an analogous role for p as T once did for p in the elementary grouping. The non-
common part, p̅q, is then the relative complement of p in q, and Piaget denotes it p’; q can 
therefore be expressed more concisely as q=p∨p’. Proceeding analogously for further 




Fig. 1 Grouping of Implications—Form I. Piaget calls p, q, r, s, t … primary propositions and their relative complements 
p’=q·p̅, q’=r·q̅, r’=s·r̅… secondary propositions. Primary propositions in the hierarchy are composed of the primary and 
secondary propositions of the previous level as follows: q=p∨p’; r=q∨q’; s=r∨r’; … Form I corresponds to the hierarchical 
nesting of classes in a classification (Piaget and Grize 1972, p. 324 Fig. 46) 
This construction is one of four forms of implication. Piaget denoted it Form I (Piaget and 
Grize 1972, 15:324–7), and it is analogous to the inclusion of classes PQRS⊂ etc. 
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familiar from biological taxonomies, genealogies, etc. Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:103) 
denoted these classes ‘primary’, and each primary class has a relative complement P’, Q’, R’ 
etc., which he (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:103) denoted ‘secondary’ classes. The 
grandchildren of a grandparent R, for example, are comprised of the children of one of R’s 
children P and their first cousins P’. In terms of primary and secondary classes, the classes 
constituting the nesting inclusions are therefore as follows: 
P⋃P’=Q, Q⋃Q’=R, R⋃R’=S, etc.  
Let propositions p, q, r, s, etc. express the membership of an element in the primary classes P, 
Q, R, S, etc., and p’, q’, r’, etc., membership of an element in the secondary classes P’, Q’, 
R’, etc. Clearly, if q is true, the element x is a member of Q=P⋃P’; x is therefore a member 
of either P or P’, i.e., p∨p’; Form I therefore corresponds to the nesting inclusions of classes 
typically found in Pyphorian trees. In fact, the intrapropositional operations on such classes 
also constitute groupings, and Form I models one of these groupings in terms of propositions 
(Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:324). For the present purposes, however, the correspondence with 
nesting inclusions of classes simply facilitates recognition of implications. Clearly, if x is an 
element of a class in this construction, it is automatically a member of all the class’s 
superclasses; correspondingly, primary p, q, r, etc. and secondary p', q', r', etc. propositions 
therefore imply primary propositions of higher rank; for example, p' implies t or r implies u, 
etc. Conversely, if x is a member of a primary class, it must be a member of one of the 
disjoint classes composing it; each primary proposition therefore implies those propositions 
composing it but as a whole; for example, s implies (p∨p'∨r'). Finally, any subclass of a 
primary class of higher order can be determined by eliminating relative complementaries; any 
proposition can therefore be inferred from those of higher rank by negating complementaries; 
e.g., q’=t∙s̅’∙r̅’∙q̅. In short, Form I is a construction in the interpropositional grouping that 
engenders a ‘play of implications’ (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:343). 
From a logical viewpoint, an explication of the nature of the implications at play is required. 
Before embarking on such an explication, though, the transition from operations of thought to 
a play of implications via deductive operations gives pause for thought. Operations are 
integral to the psychological explanation of reasoning. They have a regulatory function on 
reasoning; however, reasoners are not necessarily aware of them when reasoning. Operations 
therefore belong almost exclusively to the third-person perspective, namely, the psycho-
logical model of reasoning. For reasoners, on the other hand, certain propositions appear to 
follow from others; implications therefore have a first-person aspect as well. Moreover, 
structures within the interpropositional grouping, the forms of implications namely, mediate 
between these perspectives. The transition from operations to implications via the forms of 
implication thus illustrate how psychological explanation moves from the outside to the 
inside.  
Returning to the nature of the implications after the brief excursion into psychological 
explanation, Piaget based the interpropositional grouping on Boolean structures (Grize 2013, 
152), and a Boolean algebra is a complemented distributive lattice (Rutherford 1966; Halmos 
and Givant 1998). Lattice theory is therefore a possible perspective on the interpropositional 
grouping; and, with the help of Rutherford’s Introduction to Lattice Theory (Rutherford 1966, 
secs. 1–4, 12 & 17 esp.), I will attempt to shed some light on the nature of the implications 
engendered by deductive operations of thought. 
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A lattice can be defined in two ways. On the one hand, it is a partially ordered set in which 
any two elements have both a least upper bound (meet) and a greatest lower bound (join). For 
elements x and y of a lattice 𝓛, the meet is denoted x∪y and the join x∩y. A partially ordered 
set is an algebraic system in which a binary relation x≧y, known as an inclusion or order 
relation, is defined. On the other hand, a lattice is also a set 𝓛 of elements with two binary 
operations ∩ and ∪, which satisfy commutative, associative, and absorptive laws. Moreover, 
the two definitions can be shown to be equivalent via the identity y=x∩y  x≧y  x∪y=x.  
Logical operators have many different guises. Nevertheless, disparate guises can be shown to 
be equivalent by reducing them to their normal forms. Table 1 therefore represents a 
classification of equivalent logical operators via their normal forms. {pq∨p̅q∨pq̅∨p̅q̅} ({T} 
for short), for example, represents the class of tautologies p∨p̅, q∨q̅, etc.; {o}, contradictions 
p∧p̅, q∧q̅, etc.; {pq∨p̅q∨pq̅}, disjunction in its various guises p∨q, (pq̅), p∨q∨q, etc. Since 
the propositional connectives ∨, ∧, and   ̅ are congruent to operations ∪, ∩, and ’, 
respectively, on these classes, the operations of the grouping correspond to operations on the 
equivalence classes of the classification of logical operators. (pwq)∨pq=(p̅q∨pq̅)∨pq=p∨q, for 
example, transforms pwq into p∨q via the direct operation ∨pq, and it corresponds to 
{p̅q∨pq̅}∪{pq}={p̅q∨pq̅∨pq} in terms of classes; transforming p∨q back to pwq via the 
inverse operation ∧ (pq), on the other hand, corresponds to the relative complement of {pq} 
in {p∨q}={pq∨pq̅∨p̅q}, i.e., {p̅q∨pq̅}={pwq}.  
In CL, p⊃q has the same truth conditions as p̅∨q, namely, true except when p is true and q is 
false. Since arbitrary propositions may be substituted into the variables p and q, it is clearly 
not possible to preclude the falsity of p⊃q without imposing further constraints. p⊃q is a 
member of the same class as p̅∨q, namely, {pq∨p̅q∨p̅q̅}, and, in a free Boolean algebra, the 
postulates of a complemented distributive lattice constitute the only constraints. To determine 
the additional constraints required to make p̅∨q true without exception, consider classes of 
propositions {p}, {q} and {p}’∪{q}. p̅∨q is true without exception on condition 
{p}’∪{q}∈{T}; i.e., {q} is in the interval [{p}, {T}] or {q}≧{p}. 
Although simply an alternative representation of the equivalence classes in Table 1, a Hasse 
diagram (see Fig. 2) aids visualisation of the inclusions ordering the classes of propositions. 
Referring to Fig. 2, the condition {p}’∪{q}∈{T} is fulfilled provided {q} occupies a node on 
a line connecting {p} with {T}; for example, p[q], q[p], p∨q, etc., are propositions belonging 
to classes on lines connecting {pq} with {T}; and since the unions of their corresponding 
classes with{pq}’ are members of {T}, the implications pq⊃p[q], pq⊃q[p], pq⊃p∨q, etc. are 
true without exception. In terms of Table 1, pq thus implies in this way all those logical 




Fig. 2 Hasse Diagram of the 16 Logical Operators of Propositional Logic. The figure represents the projection on to the 
plane of a four-dimensional cube. The logical operators occupy points of intersecting lines, and the lines connecting points 
represent inclusion relations. Thus p⊃q≧pq, q[p], p̅[q], pq, p̅q, p̅q̅ and o; but not pq̅. (After Rutherford 1966, Fig. 7) 
Rutherford distinguished different ‘categories of propositions’ (1966, 50) and ordered them 
hierarchically into elementary propositions, propositions about elementary propositions and 
propositions about propositions about elementary propositions. pq, for example, is a 
proposition about the elementary propositions p and q, namely, that they are true together or 
false together; and pq can also be formally true, i.e., true for all substitutions of p and q. 
Correspondingly, p⊃q is a proposition about elementary propositions p and q, and, p⊃q can 
also be formally true, i.e., true for any substitutions of p and q. Implications p⊃q like those in 
the previous paragraph where the corresponding class {q} is in the interval [{p}, {T}] are 
therefore formally true, and Rutherford marks the difference from material implication by 
referring to this kind of implication as ‘p logically implies q’ (1966, 52).  
Generalising the grouping formed by the affirmation and negation of a single proposition p to 
multiple propositions to construct the forms of implication, Piaget, in effect, introduced 
propositions q, r, s, etc. from classes in the interval [{p}, {T}] of the elementary grouping; 
p⊃q, p⊃r, p⊃s, etc. therefore correspond to classes belonging to {T}. The implications in the 
form of implication above are therefore formally true and, using Rutherford’s terminology, p 
logically implies q, r, s, etc.  
Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:38–9) also drew attention to an ambiguity in the meaning 
of the verb ‘to imply’. The implication (p⊃q)∙(q⊃r)→(p⊃r) is true irrespective of the truth or 
falsity of the individual implications comprising it; the implications p⊃q, q⊃r, and p⊃r, on 
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the other hand, can be true or false depending on the meaning of the propositions p, q and r 
that comprise them. According to Piaget, the former implication is more formal than the latter 
since the proposition p⊃r is constructed by the conjunction of two other propositions, and he 
denoted them formal and material implication, respectively. Despite emphasising 
construction, Piaget appears to have similar distinctions in mind to those in Rutherford’s 
hierarchy of propositions. Moreover, Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:226–7 & 243) also 
distinguished between operations and relations, and illustrated the difference by contrasting 
the conditional operator p⊃q, which is false if p is true and q is false, with pqp, which is 
true regardless of the propositions substituted for p and q. Whereas the former is an 
operation, the latter is a relation because the antecedent and consequent being related ensures 
that the conditional operator is true without exception. With the aid of the Hasse diagram in 
Fig. 2, it is easy to see that pq⊃p is formally true. p[q] corresponds to {pq∨p̅q}, and, since 
{pq∨p̅q} is in the interval [{pq}, {T}], {pq}’∪{pq∨p̅q} ∈ {T}. From the viewpoint of a lattice, 
an inclusion relation therefore exists between the consequent and antecedent in pq⊃p, 
namely, {p[q]}≧{pq}. An inclusion relation between the antecedent and consequent thus 
appears to capture the distinction between relations and operations made by Piaget. Returning 
to the form of implication, {q}, {r}, {s}, etc. are in the interval [{p}, {T}]; the implications 
p⊃q, p⊃r, p⊃s, etc. therefore represent relations rather than operations, namely, {q}≧{p}, 
{r}≧{p}, {s}≧{p}, etc. 
In summary, Piaget constructed deductive operations by introducing propositions from 
classes in the interval [{p}, {T}]. Since {p}’∪{q}∈{T} for any such proposition q, the 
implications engendered are formally true; on the one hand, then, formal implications are at 
play in the forms of implication; on the other hand, {q}≧{p}; p⊃q is therefore formally true 
because there is an inclusion relation between the antecedent and consequent. It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that Piaget intended to targeted logical implication in making logic 
the formal theory of deductive operations. 
Before examining how Piaget uses his theory of reasoning to inform logic, it is worth 
highlighting that relations such as pq⊃p are also known as logical truths. Although there is no 
consensus on what properties logical truths purportedly possess, the first-person experiences 
reasoners associate with them—intuitively true, a priori, necessarily true, etc.— traditionally 
made the strongest case for exceptionalism about logic. On the Piagetian view, however, they 
are within the scope of a psychological explanation. 
3.2 Psychology as Logical Evidence 
In the previous two sections, formal truth and deductive operations were dealt with 
separately; however, they cannot remain separate if the logical theory Piaget had in mind is to 
be a formal theory of deductive operations. To navigate the hazards of psychologism, Piaget 
used the following compass: 
Between the formal theory and the real analysis, there is … exactly the same 
relationship as between any axiomatic and any concomitant real research (for 
example, between axiomatic geometry and the geometry of physical 
objects): complete independence of methods and possible correspondence of 
problems (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:15 my translation)  
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The paradoxes of material implication are a problem besetting CL, and Piaget used the 
method quoted as his compass to chart a passage through the hazards of psychologism to a 
solution of ex falso quodlibet. Before examining Piaget’s approach to this paradox, however, 
the quotation also reveals how Piaget envisaged a formal theory despite never having actually 
elaborated one. The comparison with geometry in the quote indicates that Piaget had a system 
of axioms and rules of inference in mind. His conception of a formal theory is clearly shaped 
by the axiomatic method, and, like logicians with similar conceptions, Piaget also attached 
considerable weight to logical truths.4 Moreover, Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, vol. 15, sec. 
Inroduction: 4) stressed the importance of the axiomatic style of formalization in banishing 
extraneous influences on logic, especially those emanating from psychology. Piaget thus 
associates analyticity in the Fregean sense5 with his formal theory.  
Before casting off, it is advisable to ensure the vessel is ship-shape and Bristol-fashion. 
Piaget (e.g., Piaget and Beth 1966, 12:180–1) adopted the tools of propositional calculus, but 
he adapted them to constructivist ends. Commensurate with practice in propositional 
calculus, he referred to the binary operator ⊃ interchangeably as ‘implication’ or 
‘conditional’; in this context, ‘implication’ denotes an operand of the interpropositional 
grouping. Form I of implications, also, engenders implications; however, ‘implication’ in this 
context is a relation in which propositions follow logically from others. The term 
‘implication’ is therefore being used ambiguously, and it would be prudent to disambiguate it 
before casting off.  
In principle, Piaget disambiguated ‘implication’ by distinguishing between operations and 
relations, on the one hand, and material and formal implications, on the other; however, he 
continued to use ‘conditional’ and ‘implication’ interchangeably for the operator. To 
minimise misunderstanding, I will therefore endeavour to refer to the relation exclusively as 
‘implication’ and the operator exclusively as ‘conditional’ and denote them → and ⊃, 
respectively. For the remainder of the voyage, then, p implies q will be denoted p→q, 
provided there is some relation between p and q ensuring that the conditional operator p⊃q is 
formally true. 
The material conditional (=MC), p⊃q is defined truth-functionally in CL. It is true for all 
combinations of truth-values of propositions p and q except when p is true and q is false. It 
can be expressed equivalently in terms of conjunctions, disjunctions and negation as p̅ ∨q or 
pq∨p̅q∨p̅q̅, and the conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms set out the conditions under 
which p⊃q is true. However, validity in CL is purely a matter of form, and, since the 
relevance of antecedents and consequents in MC is not a formal requirement, it is possible to 
find substitutions that are counterintuitive. If q is true or p is false, for example, the exception 
is automatically ruled out, and MC must be true. Since q⊃(p⊃q), positive paradox, and 
p⊃(p̅⊃q), ex falso quodlibet, satisfy these formal requirements, they are valid formulae in 
CL; however, inferences from a true statement like ‘I am alive’ to ‘if I am dead, I am alive’ 
or ‘if I’m not alive, I’m famous/everyone is happy/everyone is sad/etc.’6 are intuitively false. 
 
4 Piaget was not well acquainted with contemporary developments in mathematical logic (Grize 2013, 149) 
5 Shapiro (2000, 108–9) draws attention to changes in the meaning of ‘analyticity’ introduced by Frege and I use 
the term here in this sense. 
6 The examples come from (Restall 2006, 65) 
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‘Paradox’ has a variety of meanings (Quine 1966). Although they represent a mismatch 
between the CL account of MC and intuition rather than contradictions from valid reasoning, 
the formulae are nevertheless known collectively as paradoxes of material implication. 
Moreover, the mismatch is due to counterintuitive examples satisfying valid formulae in CL. 
In terms of the mirror metaphor Piaget used to express the relationship between a logic and 
thought, CL does not reflect some forms of counterintuitive reasoning. In other words, there 
are blind spots in the mirror.  
Acceptance and denial broadly characterise positions on the mismatch. Those in denial are 
obliged to explain, or explain away, the paradoxes whilst accepting that CL adequately 
reflects reasoning whether it be transacted in the formal language of mathematics or the 
vernacular. Those accepting the mismatch, on the other hand, often point out that CL was not 
developed for reasoning transacted in the vernacular but for mathematical reasoning, and the 
paradoxes of MC are the result of misappropriation. However, it is considered to be the mark 
of a good theory that its explanatory power exceeds, sometimes by far, the limited field of 
phenomena initially investigated—one only has to call to mind the regularities in free-falling 
bodies discovered by Galileo on the basis of crude observations and the role they played in 
explaining terrestrial and planetary motions in Newton’s hands (e.g., Wigner 1960). 
However, the positions are only ‘broadly’ as black-and-white as I have portrayed. Gabbay 
and Woods (2005, sec. 1.4) draw attention to the conciliatory tones struck, especially by 
those accepting the mismatch. 
Formalisation in CL is the process of finding the CL counterparts of reasoning transacted in 
the vernacular. It maps vernacular structures into logical forms in CL in such a way that the 
property possessed by the logical form formalising the vernacular structure in CL reflects 
backwards onto the vernacular itself. Consequently, if a structure of CL formalising a 
vernacular structure has certain logical properties, the vernacular structure formalised does 
too. The central principle governing formalisation of the vernacular in CL is known as 
backwards reflection, and the following truth-conditional relationship obtains for the 
connectives: the falsity of the formalisation of the vernacular sentence is sufficient for the 
falsity of the vernacular sentence but not conversely, and the truth of a sentence in either the 
vernacular or its formalisation is not sufficient for the truth of the corresponding sentence. In 
other words, the mirror has a special polish due to the principle of backwards reflection, in 
which vernacular sentences and their formalisation in CL are not logically equivalent, let 
alone synonymous, and counterintuitive reasoning in the vernacular is not always reflected. 
From an operatory viewpoint, on the other hand, the propositions p and q in p⊃q are related 
in such a way that pq, p̅q, and p̅q̅ are true whereas pq̅ is not true. In p̅⊃q, on the other hand, 
p̅q, pq, and pq̅ whereas p̅q̅ is not true. Since p̅q̅ is true in p⊃q but cannot be true in p̅⊃q and 
pq̅ is true in the latter but cannot be true in the former, p⊃q and p̅⊃q are incompatible from 
an operatory point of view; consequently, Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:244) objected 
vehemently to paraphrasing ex falso quodlibet  as ‘the false implies the true’. From an 
operatory point of view, p can be false when q is true in the conditional operator but that does 
not mean that the false implies the true. The problem, according to Piaget, boils down to 
understanding how p̅q can be true whilst pq̅ cannot in the conditional operator.  
In Piaget’s rational reconstruction of the genesis of the interpropositional grouping, extending 
the elementary grouping to multiple propositions by introducing new propositions in the 
18 
 
interval [{p}, {T}] excludes the possibility that the antecedents of the conditionals 
constructed are true and the consequents false. For q=p∨p’, for example, p is included in q 
(see Fig. 2), and the truth of pq̅ is excluded in this construction; however, the truth of p’=p̅q 
is not. The form of implication thus illustrates a construction in which p̅q can be true whilst 
pq̅ is definitely false.  
However, simply excluding pq̅ from being true is not sufficient to ensure that the relationship 
between the propositions p and q is in fact p⊃q. Referring to Table 1, pq̅ is false in eight of 
the logical operators; excluding pq̅ thus narrows down the number of operators by half; 
however, the shortlist is not yet short enough since a whole host of candidates still cannot be 
ruled out. Besides pq̅ being false, the truth of the conjunctions pq, p̅q and p̅q̅ must also be 
taken into account. From an operatory point of view, p⊃q is a distinct logical operator among 
the 16 operands of the interpropositional grouping involving two propositions, and it is 
uniquely determined by the truth of all three conjunctions as well as the falsity of pq̅. In CL, 
in contrast, pq∨p̅q∨p̅q̅ is the characteristic form of the conditional, and it is true when any of 
these conjunctions is true; in fact, the conjunctions are incompatible in CL and cannot 
therefore be true simultaneously. Moreover, conjunction, equivalence and the conditional 
have pq in common, and the conditional also has p̅q̅ in common with the equivalence. 
Discriminating conjunctions, equivalences and conditionals is thus not always possible in CL, 
although they are distinct operands of the interpropositional grouping. In other words, the 
polish of CL as a mirror does not adequately reflect the conditional operator as a distinct 
operand of the interpropositional grouping.  
The formal theory of the conditional p⊃q as a deductive operation has to fulfil two conditions 
to be an adequate reflection: on the one hand, the truth of pq̅ has to be excluded for p⊃q to be 
a deductive operation; on the other hand, the conditional, even as a deductive operation, is 
still a distinct operand of the interpropositional grouping, and the formal theory must also 
reflect this fact. The truth of p̅q is sufficient to distinguish the conditional p⊃q from both 
conjunction and equivalence, and, according to Piaget, it is key to delineating the reflections 
of the conditional, conjunction and equivalence in the formal theory. Implication should 
therefore be a ternary rather than a binary expression according to Piaget (Piaget and Grize 
1972, 15:245–6):  
p→q means (p→q)∙(p’→q) where p’↔p̅·q7 
Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, 15:246) also expressed implication as follows: 
p→q therefore q↔(p∨p’), 
and he held both expressions to be equivalent. Referring back to the Hasse diagram in Fig. 2, 
for {q[p]}={pq∨p̅q}, {q[p]}≧{pq} and {q[p]}≧{p̅q} but not {pq}≧{q[p]}; pq⊃q[p] and 
p̅q⊃q[p] are therefore formally true, i.e., pq→q[p] and p̅q→q[p]. On condition q∈[{p}’, 
{T}], which is the case in the forms of implication, the different formulations thus represent 
alternative expressions. 
Ex falso quodlibet is by no means the only paradox besetting CL, and in ‘Paradoxes of 
Material Implication—a Piagetian Perspective’, I extend Piaget’s approach to further 
 
7 Like p→q and p⊃q, p↔q denotes the formal truth of the logical operator pq. 
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paradoxes. In Piaget’s theory of propositional reasoning, the conditional operator is a distinct 
operand of the interpropositional grouping uniquely determined by pq, p̅q, and p̅q̅ being true 
and pq̅, false. In CL, on the other hand, the characteristic form pq∨p̅q∨p̅q̅ represents the truth-
conditions of MC; however, only one of these conjunctions can be true in CL, and MC is true 
when one of them is true. On the basis of a single conjunction of MC’s characteristic form, 
however, the conditional operator of the interpropositional grouping is not uniquely 
determined. Several distinct logical operators of the interpropositional grouping correspond 
to each conjunction of the characteristic form of MC in CL; CL cannot therefore adequately 
reflect the conditional operator as a distinct operand of the interpropositional grouping. In 
other words, the conditional operator as a distinct operand of the interpropositional grouping 
is not reflected backwards by CL and is therefore not an adequate formalisation of Piaget’s 
theory of reasoning.  
Piaget highlighted p̅q as being key in delineating p⊃q from other deductive operators and 
substituted a ternary operator involving p, p’=p̅q and q for a binary operator in CL to take this 
into account. As already mentioned, Piaget did not fully develop a logical theory based on his 
psychological theory of reasoning, but an ad hoc amendment of CL can be ruled out because 
the conjunctions uniquely characterising any logical operator of the interpropositional 
grouping are incompatible in CL and therefore cannot be true simultaneously. The crux of the 
problem seems to be that a logical theory must take into account the fact that logical 
operators are involved in reasoning and therefore already parts of a natural structure. 
Intuitively, logic is an integral part of reasoning, and deductive operations are an integral part 
of the interpropositional grouping in Piaget’s theory of reasoning. Although Piaget never 
actually formulated a logical theory, he cut a factual key to open a door on this intuition. 
Moreover, a logical theory of deductive operations based on logical implication as the 
corresponding logical property seems to be a viable proposition in the light of lattice theory. 
Be that as it may, the fact that Piaget used a psychological theory of reasoning to diagnose 
and suggest a credible solution to a logical problem is salient for the present purposes since it 
illustrates how psychology can serve as evidence for a logical theory.  
4 Exceptionalism vs Anti-Exceptionalism in Light of Psychology as a 
Source of Logical Evidence. 
4.1 The Dogma of Psychologism, a Case for Anti-exceptionalism 
Since Frege’s criticism of psychologism, psychology and logic have gone their separate 
ways. In theory, Piaget respected the strict division of labour. Developmental psychology à la 
Piaget explains the emergence of operational structures by describing the development of 
operations of thought in states of equilibrium from their origin in the most elementary co-
ordinations of actions on arbitrary objects. In equilibrium, operations of thought form well-
structured systems of operations, which psycho-logic models using algebraic tools. The 
psychological theory of reasoning is therefore a causal explanation of our ability to reason, 
and it has synchronic and diachronic aspects. On the other hand, Piaget contrasted ordinary 
truth with formal truth, the former referring to the correspondence between the constructs of 
the mind and the subject matter targeted; the latter referring simply to the coherence, 
agreement, implication and exclusion of propositions, etc. without concern for their actual 
truth. Formal truth characterises logic, according to Piaget, and he advocated the axiomatic 
method for logic in order to purify it of extraneous influences such as folk psychology. He 
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thereby distinguished between logical and substantial axiomatizations. The grouping models 
the structured wholes operations of thought in a state of equilibrium constitute. Since it 
corresponds to psychological facts, it is thus a substantial axiomatization despite its formal 
appearance. An axiomatization of logic, in contrast, is a formal system, in which formulae are 
derived from others postulated as axioms using rules of inference. Although Piaget did not set 
out a logical theory, his characterization of logic is commensurate with accepted logical 
properties, and it conforms with the axiomatic tradition initiated by Frege.  
The division of labour Piaget advocated corresponds to one GER Lloyd developed to capture 
the perspectivism of historical research. Lloyd (2007, nn. 2, 3 pp. 6–7; 2010, 204–5) 
introduces the ‘multidimensionality of phenomena’ and corresponding ‘styles of inquiry’. 
With the former he counters the temptation to maintain that there is only one mode of inquiry 
yielding accurate results for any scientific subject matter by pointing out that phenomena 
invariably have many different aspects, which can be brought to light by appropriate modes 
of inquiry; however, none of these aspects is inherently more correct than any other. By the 
latter, Lloyd means the various methods, procedures and equipment used in diverse areas of 
scientific research to discover, engender or even create the subject matter under investigation. 
Interpropositional operations as Piaget understands them are clearly multidimensional mental 
phenomena. On the one hand, formal truth characterizes logic, and the interpropositional 
operations of the grouping have a relationship to truth via the propositions they operate on. 
The style of inquiry commensurate with the truth dimension of interpropositional operations 
focusses on the typical subject matter for logical theories, namely coherence, validity, truth 
preservation, provability, etc. On the other hand, interpropositional operations also have a 
psycho-sociological aspect, and the appropriate style of inquiry is causal explanation. For 
Piaget, the causal explanation is diachronic and synchronic, the former explaining by 
describing the development of the equilibria operations of thought from their origins in 
coordination of actions on arbitrary objects and the latter by modelling the structured wholes 
operations of thought form in the states of equilibrium.  
In theory, Piaget demarcated different dimensions of interpropositional operations and their 
styles of inquiry; however, he also used the psychological dimension to shed light on a 
logical problem, namely, ex falso quodlibet. In practice, then, he did not consider the 
dimensions to be orthogonal. Piaget expressed the relationship between the dimensions 
metaphorically as logic mirroring thought; however, he did not hide behind a metaphor. 
Logic is the formal theory of deductive operations, according to Piaget, and based on this 
formula, he used independence of methods but possible correspondence of problems as his 
compass to navigate the hazards of psychologism. Charting this course, he diagnosed the 
problem in this paradox to be the definition of MC in CL not always adequately reflecting the 
fact that the conditional operator is a distinct operand in the interpropositional grouping. His 
resolution of the paradox is then based on this insight; however, it cannot be interpreted as a 
simple ad hoc augmentation of CL. On the one hand, Piaget’s logical theory targeted a 
proposition cubed not squared, i.e., logical rather than material implication. Whilst an 
extension of CL could accommodate logical implication, the conjunctions of the 
characteristic form of MC in CL are incompatible and cannot therefore be true 
simultaneously as they are in the conditional operator of the interpropositional grouping. It is 
thus doubtful that extensions of CL could ever accurately reflect logical properties inherent in 
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the interpropositional grouping;8 nevertheless, there is to my mind no reason why psychology 
thus understood cannot serve as a source of logical evidence for a logical theory.  
Science is a social endeavour, and the sociology of knowledge has revealed many external 
factors influencing its development (e.g., Kuhn 1960; Barnes 1977; Shapin 1982; Collins 
1983; Shapin 2008). The fact that psychology could be but is not generally countenanced as a 
source of logical evidence for logical theories seems to me to be due to external rather than 
internal factors. Logic long enjoyed an exceptional status; however, a cursory glance at 
typical arguments against psychologism (e.g., Jacquette 2003a, sec. 4) reveals that they are 
designed to defend many of those qualities purportedly conferring logic an exceptional status. 
Admitting any dependency on the findings of psychology would thus be tantamount to 
surrendering logic’s exceptional status—how Ancient-Greek cosmology made astronomy go 
round in circles until Johannes Kepler springs to mind. Psychologism is embroiled in the 
exceptionalism/anti-exceptionalism discourse and will surface in subsequent discussion. Be 
that as it may, the accusation of psychologism became a dogma damning logical theories 
suspected of psychological inclinations with an almost inquisitional zeal; there are, however, 
voices in the desert: those who wish to rekindle debate and redress the imbalance by 
encouraging a more discerning approach to psychologism (Jacquette 2003a, secs. 2–4; 
Gabbay and Woods 2005; van Benthem 2008; Stenning and van Lambalgen 2008). 
The accusation of psychologism is an idiosyncrasy of logic; however, similar controversies 
are typical of science in general, and I concur with Martin and Hjortland: 
neither the problem of what exactly ought to constitute evidence for a logical 
theory, nor how we ought to select and weight theoretical virtues within a 
theory-choice, are particular to logical epistemology. While both questions 
are worthy of discussion, the disagreements that inevitably flow from asking 
them are no more an indication of a fatal flaw with the anti-exceptionalist 
account of logic than abductivist methodologies within other research areas. 
These are issues not specific to logic, but concerns raised over theory-choice 
more generally. In facing these problems then, logical methodology is again 
not exceptional. (Martin and Hjortland 2021, sec. 5) 
4.2 Tertium Quid 
If psychologism did prejudice the development of logical theories against using psychology 
as a source of logical evidence, scope may exist for a logical theory that accommodates the 
findings of psychology. Perhaps because epistemology was his primary research interest, 
Piaget never, to my knowledge, actually set out the details of such a logical theory (Apostel 
1982; Grize 2013). Nevertheless, some insights can still be garnered on the basis of the 
indications he has given. 
Although the properties logical truths purportedly possess are contentious, they have 
undoubtedly contributed in some measure to the exceptional status attributed to logic. Piaget 
distinguished between operations and relations on the one hand and formal and material 
implication on the other. Since both relations and formal implications are formally true, they 
 
8 In ‘Paradoxes of Material Implication—a Piagetian Perspective’, I also conclude that CL and Piaget’s logical 




would qualify as logical truths. However, relations are formally true, according to Piaget, 
because the propositions involved in the logical operator are related; formal implication on 
the other hand because of a prior construction. At first blush, the grounds for them being 
formally true are different; however, the forms of implication mediate between these 
explanations. On the one hand, the form of implication illustrated in Fig. 1 is a construction, 
and the implications engendered are formally true; on the other hand, there is also an 
inclusion relation between the antecedent and consequent. From a Piagetian perspective, then, 
prior constructions constitute relations. Moreover, the constructions in question originate in 
operations of thought, and operations of thought originate in the co-ordinations of actions on 
arbitrary objects; logical truths on this view therefore have roots in the activity of the subject.  
Empiricists traditionally regarded sense experience as the only source of knowledge. 
Rationalists, on the other hand, argued against the empirical origin of logical truths by 
drawing attention to the exceptional properties they purportedly possess. The strength of 
empiricism lies in its ability to explain how thought fits fact, but it struggles to explain the 
exceptional properties of logical truths; for rationalism, on the other hand, the strengths and 
weakness are reversed. However, with constructivism as an alternative explanation for the 
exceptional properties of logical truths, an argument against empiricism cannot be 
automatically construed as an argument for rationalism. On the other hand, empiricists, those 
at least who believe sense experience to be the source of logical truths, have little to gain 
from rationalism’s setback because logical truths, being constructions, originate in the 
activity of the subject rather than sense experience. For Piaget constructivism is a tertium 
quid: 
the operational constructivism suggested by genetic analysis is reduced 
neither to empiricism nor to apriorism, because we could not derive 
intelligence itself from objects … and because the subject does not possess 
frameworks which contain all reason in advance, but only a certain activity 
which allows him to construct operational structures. (Piaget and Beth 1966, 
12:285)  
Regarding logical truths as constructions has ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-
exceptionalism on logic. Just as the senses are required to perceive the empirical world, 
logical truths being different from empirical truths were thought to require their own special 
mental faculty for grasping them. From the viewpoint of constructivism, however, logical 
truths are also a priori, but they are constructed rather than being preformed. Moreover, 
construction is all that is required to grasp them. Of course, the subjective reconstruction of 
denizens populating another realm is consistent with a priori truths not appearing to be 
preformed, and metaphysical realism cannot be ruled-out entirely. However, from a 
constructivist point of view, it a redundant hypothesis since construction confers 
consciousness and no special cognitive faculty other than construction is evident. 
In summary, a logical theory à la Piaget would be continuous with psychology, and it would 
therefore be revisable on the basis of a posteriori evidence derived from a psychological 
theory of reasoning. Logical truths, on the other hand, would be a priori in the sense that they 
can be grasped without the aid of the senses; however, they would not constitute a preformed 
reality requiring a special mental means to grasp them; construction would be sufficient. 
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Constructivism thus weakens exceptionalism by integrating the purportedly exceptional 
properties of logical truths into a psychological explanation.  
However, there is a reverse side to every medal, and constructivism inherits problems either 
empiricism or rationalism purportedly solved. Psychology is descriptive; logic on the other 
hand is thought to be prescriptive. The transition from description to prescription thus 
becomes a conundrum for a logical theory that is continuous with psychology. Moreover, 
logic looks out for other forms of knowledge but not vice versa. Logic has to look out for 
itself, but without a special means of grasping apodictic truths it is hard to vouch for this 
exceptional ability. On the other hand, logic is an essential tool for all sciences and can 
accommodate all manner of phenomena; however, logic being adapted to all manner of 
phenomena constitutes as much a riddle for constructivism as it does for rationalism. On the 
one hand, explaining a mind-independent reality, even aspects as fundamental as causality, is 
only possible by means of the structures of operations of thought. Whilst ensuring a logical 
theory based on constructivism is immune to empirical falsification, it is of no assistance in 
explaining how a logical theory is fit for this job. On the other hand, operations of thought 
originate in the activity of the subject, namely, the coordination of actions on arbitrary 
objects; they do not therefore even have roots in the properties of the mind-independent 
reality they help to describe and explain. In short, the fit of thought and fact is as much a 
problem for constructivism as rationalism, and the prescriptivity and basicness of logic as 
much a problem for constructivism as empiricism.  
4.3 Genetic Epistemology and the Challenges facing Anti-Exceptionalism  
There are problems with anti-exceptionalism about logic, which arise from rejecting 
rationalism. For example, there is no consensus amongst logicians on the role logic should 
play: some argue that logic only has a descriptive role to play whilst others hold that it should 
improve or replace vernacular judgements (Martin and Hjortland 2021, sec. 5). In other 
words, logic is thought not only to be descriptive but also prescriptive. Moreover, even 
logical theories that are descriptive are not indiscriminate concerning what counts as logical 
evidence. Priest (2016, sec. 2.5), for example, considers natural-language intuitions to be a 
source of logical evidence; however, they have to be ‘robust’ (Priest 2016, 44). He accepts 
that these intuitions are subject to systematic performance errors, and, although mistakes can 
easily be recognized and purged when highlighted, the upshot is that natural-language 
intuitions are not infallible and judgement is required to separate the sheep from the goats.9 
Comparing laws of truth with laws of nature, Frege (1998, 32:XV) drew attention to the 
descriptive and prescriptive aspects of both. The law of gravity does not just describe how 
objects have fallen to earth but how they fall, thereby dictating how we should think about 
falling objects. Psychologically, judgements have causal explanations, but there is no scope 
for normative evaluations on the basis of causality alone. The different rates at which objects 
actually fall to Earth also have causal explanations, but it would not be possible to maintain 
that the rate of fall is better approximated by a lead sphere than a feather without reference to 
 
9 Referring to natural language intuitions as a source of logical evidence, Priest (2016, 44) requires them to be 
robust; i.e., purged of performance errors. However, there is no independent criteria for their robustness; the 
people making the mistakes simply recognised them when the error is pointed out. 
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the law of gravity. Analogously, it is not possible to assess whether reasoning is correct or not 
on the basis of causality alone.  
In psychology, competence and performance are distinguished (e.g., Flavell and Wohlwill 
1969; Overton and Newman 1982). The distinction is much like that between genotype and 
phenotype in biology. The genotype refers to the part of the genetic code offspring inherit 
from their parent organisms; the phenotype, on the other hand, refers to the physical and 
behavioural traits. The genotype generates the phenotype but not conversely. The genotype is 
only affected by the phenotype indirectly insofar as survival and mating and therefore the 
transmission of the genetic code from one generation to the next depends on phenotypical 
traits. Although the structured wholes operations of thought in a state of equilibrium form are 
not inherited, they distinguish competence from performance just as the genetic code 
distinguishes the genotype from the phenotype. The interpropositional grouping, in particular, 
corresponds to competence in propositional reasoning, and it determines the type of 
reasoning tasks reasoners with this level of competence should be able to master; actual 
performance on the other hand is situative, and many factors may contrive to cause reasoners 
to reason below par. Nevertheless, Piaget’s theory of reasoning is both descriptive and 
prescriptive because reasoning competence is distinct from performance and no more a 
theoretical fiction than the law of gravity. Moreover, a logical theory adequately reflecting 
the operations of thought in a state of equilibrium, although not causal itself, would reflect 
competence and would therefore not only be descriptive but also prescriptive with respect to 
actual performance.10 
Finally, logic and mathematics are thought to be distinct despite both being a priori, from the 
viewpoint of exceptionalism. They are both indispensable to science; however, mathematics 
can still appeal to logic to derive its theories whereas logic can only look to itself. In the 
absence of special logical faculties, choice of a logical theory must be based on rational 
grounds; however, the validity of any argument is based on a logical theory. Hence a logical 
theory either undermines its own justification if the arguments used are not supported by the 
theory or the arguments supporting the theory are supported by the theory. However, in the 
latter case, logical theories are self-justifying, and preferences for one theory over another are 
arbitrary from a logical point of view. In essence, the problem is circularity (Priest 2016, sec. 
3.4), and Martin and Hjortland coined the expression ‘background logic problem’ (Martin 
and Hjortland 2021, sec. 5) to denote it.  
The background logic problem was the original motivation for the exceptionalism of logic, 
and it still poses the strongest challenge for anti-exceptionalism, according to Martin and 
Hjortland (2021, sec. 5). Rather than being the greatest challenge, however, the background 
logic problem may actually be its strongest ally. 
Although it is widely accepted now that empirical evidence is theory-laden, theory and 
evidence are still thought to spring ultimately from different sources, and the adequacy of a 
scientific theory is measured by its correspondence with empirical evidence. In the human 
sciences, the sources are not always distinct.  Reasoning is a case in point. Mathematics, the 
sciences, juris prudence, even the vernacular, etc., are sources of inference, which can 
 




become objects of study. However, assessing such arguments and inferences from the point 
of view of rationality relies on the very capacity that generated them in the first place.   
Following Gabbay and Woods (Gabbay and Woods 2005, sec. 2), for example, cognitive 
systems are comprised of a cognitive agent, cognitive resources, as well as a cognitive agenda 
executed in real time, and reasoning in practice is constrained accordingly by agents’ 
agendas, competence, and the resources at their disposable. Cognitive systems can be 
individuals or institutions, and they can be partially ordered according to the cognitive 
resources at their command relative to the cognitive goals aspired to. The performance of 
individual reasoners is a modest affaire, far from being infallible but right enough enough of 
the time. Having substantially more resources at their disposal, research communities on the 
other hand are more ambitious, and, by pooling their resources, they can eliminate 
performance errors in aspects of reasoning thus producing robust results. Using Gabbay and 
Wood’s denotation, the former are practical agents whereas the latter are theoretical agents, 
and theoretical agents can achieve all the goals practical agents can, while the latter may not 
have the resources to aspire to and attain the same goals as the former. Nevertheless, practical 
agents acknowledge, perhaps on authority, the robust results of theoretical agents. Whilst 
practical agents can defer to theoretical agents, reasoning is still executive and judiciary for 
the latter, and a circularity similar to the background logic problem arises. Moreover, 
consensus rather than correspondence is the criterion of robustness.11  
Although perhaps more obvious in the human sciences, circularity is not thought to be 
confined to them. Discussing William Alston’s work on epistemic circularity, Lammanranta 
(2018, sec. 1) claims that any source of knowledge when interrogated to the utmost ends up 
in a circle. Arguing that perceptual evidence is a reliable source of knowledge, for example, 
one could proceed inductively by listing past instances of perception being reliable evidence. 
However, when asked to justify belief in each instance of perception being reliable, one is 
forced to resort to the conclusion, namely, that perception is a reliable source of knowledge. 
In other words, justification of belief in the conclusion requires evidence, but belief in the 
evidence is justified by the conclusion. Seen in the context of science in general, the 
background logic problem is thus a problem of circularity that logic shares with other 
sciences. Moreover, even intuition if quizzed on its reliability as a special source of logical 
evidence would not escape epistemic circularity. Rather than revealing an exceptional feature 
of logic, then, the background logic problem is an additional argument for anti-
exceptionalism. 
Of course, the main concern is not circularity per se but whether the circle is vicious. 
Epistemic circularity is not thought to be vicious; however, it is not discriminating 
(Lammenranta 2018, sec. 1)—much like logical theories. Piaget (1950a, vol. 1, sec. 
Introduction 6) also considered knowledge to be circular, but he did not believe that 
epistemic circularity is necessarily vicious. In practice, the sciences cope with the inherent 
circularity of attaining knowledge on the basis of beliefs by expanding the scope of any 
theory so that convergence in the growing coherence of its propositions warrants belief in the 
circularity not being vicious. Logic as a formal theory of deductive operations of thought, for 
example, would integrate logic into the structuralism of genetic psychology, on the one hand, 
 
11 According to Priest (2016, 40–1), logic is a social science; theory and subject matter in logic may not 
therefore enjoy the same independence as in the natural sciences. 
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and, via Boolean algebra, into the structures of mathematics, on the other (Piaget 1970, sec. 
7). Returning to the present context, it will be recalled that psychological explanations 
according to Piaget have two aspects, and the analogy with falling objects helps show how 
these aspects can be seen to converge and support each other mutually. Phenomenally, 
objects of all shapes and sizes falling in Earth’s atmosphere do not actually fall according to 
the gravitational law; analogously, the practical agent is far from being infallible when 
reasoning but right enough enough of the time. However, any object regardless of shape and 
size really does begin to fall increasingly in accordance with the law of gravity as the 
atmosphere is progressively rarefied. Analogously, as theoretical agents take the reins from 
their practical counterparts and generate increasingly robust results, performance 
approximates to competence. The crowded scrutiny of communities of researchers is thus for 
the investigation of reasoning what the void is for free falling bodies. According to Piaget 
(e.g., Piaget 1950b, vol. 3, chap. VII sec. 7), objectivity is intersubjective objectivity; Piaget 
therefore also developed a sociological theory of reasoning, which he based on his 
psychological theory of reasoning (Kitchener 1996; Kitchener 2004; Kitchener 2009). 
However, just as freefall in a vacuum would be just one phenomenon amongst many without 
the law of gravity, the consensus of theoretical agents might be indistinguishable from 
conventions and coercions of the crowd without a theory of reasoning. On this view, 
‘theoretical agent’ turns out to be a particularly apt terminology since it is the means through 
which the interpropositional grouping imminent in reasoning and therefore the psychological 
theory of reasoning itself manifests most purely in practice. Be that as it may, logic does not 
only have circularity in common with the other sciences but it can only allay its own 
circularity in conjunction with the other sciences: on the Piagetian view, namely, the 
virtuosity of the circle vouches for it not being vicious. Logic is thus far from being 
exceptional on account of the background logic problem, and it is as dependent on the other 
sciences to solve this problem as they are on it.  
Piaget’s constructivism weaves logic into a web of beliefs like more contemporary forms of 
empiricism; logic is therefore substantiated indirectly by the victories of the empirical 
sciences that cannot do without it. Nevertheless, logic does not hang by a thread from the 
empirical sciences, content to celebrate its own standing vicariously in victories of the latter. 
Logic is a thread like any other woven into the fabric of a scientific worldview, making its 
humble contribution to the quality of the cloth. However, the fabric remains flawed. Logic 
originates in the activity of the subject according to constructivism; despite finding comfort 
in its coherence with empirical sciences, then, constructivism does not explain the fit of logic 
and fact like traditional empiricism. 
5 In Balance 
Piaget envisaged a logical theory based on a psychological theory of reasoning. Although he 
never formulated the logical theory in any detail, it was supposed to mirror deductive 
operations of thought. He did, however, appeal to his psychological theory of reasoning to 
diagnose and suggest a solution to ex falso quodlibet, thus illustrating how psychology can 
serve as a source of logical evidence for a logical theory. Piaget’s logical theory would be 
continuous with psychology, and like other scientific theories its development would be 
subject to external factors. Being a reflection of a psychological theory of reasoning, Piaget’s 
logical theory would also presumably be subject to revision as new psychological evidence 
comes to light. The constructivism inherent in Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning 
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explains the a priori nature of logical truths without recourse to a special mental means of 
grasping them, thereby undermining the strongest argument for exceptionalism about logic. 
However, constructivism cannot capitalise on the traditional empiricist explanation for the fit 
of thought and fact since logical truths originate in the activity of the subject. Nevertheless, 
constructivism seems to cope well with the greatest challenges anti-exceptionalism about 
logic has to face. On the one hand, the strict demarcation of logic and empirical sciences 
along the lines of prescription and description appears to be an exaggeration. On the other 
hand, the background logic problem is symptomatic of the circularity imminent in all 
scientific knowledge. Moreover, a logical theory cannot solve the problem of circularity 
alone; it must join forces with the other sciences to determine whether the circularity is 
vicious or not. In balance, basing a logical theory on the evidence of a psychological theory 
of reasoning as Piaget indicated appears to be feasible, and it would appear to make an 
exceptionally strong case for anti-exceptionalism. 
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